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INTRODUCTION 
 Writing at the dawn of the digital era, John Perry Barlow 
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom. Addressing 
the nations of the world, he cautioned that their laws, which were “based 
on matter,” simply did not speak to conduct in the new virtual realm.1 As 
both Barlow and the cyberlaw scholars who took up his call recognized, 
that was not so much a statement of fact as it was an exercise in 
deliberate utopianism. But it has proved prescient in a way that they 
certainly did not intend. The “laws” that increasingly have no meaning in 
online environments include not only the mandates of market regulators 
but also the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights of 
internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms 
whose supremacy Barlow asserted. More generally, in the networked 
information era, protections for fundamental human rights—both on- and 
offline—have begun to fail comprehensively. 
 Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for 
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it also 
hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay, adapted from a 
forthcoming book on the evolution of legal institutions in the information 
era,2 I identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet 
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: utopianism 
about platforms for distributed cultural and political production (and 
concomitant failure to reckon with the transformative force of 
informational capitalism); utopianism about anonymity as a force for 
institutional disruption (and concomitant failure to acknowledge the 
essential role of institutions in cabining the human capacity for malice 
and mayhem); and utopianism about the relationship between 
information and communication networks and human freedom (and 
concomitant failure to contend with the powerful and inherently 
informational mechanisms by which existing protections for human 
rights are increasingly outflanked and coopted). It has become 
increasingly apparent that functioning legal institutions have 
 
1 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5 (2012) (originally published on Feb. 8, 1996). 
2 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019). 
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indispensable roles to play in protecting and advancing human freedom. 
It has also become increasingly apparent, however, that the legal 
institutions we need are different than the ones we have.  
I. THE PLATFORMIZATION OF EVERYTHING:  
DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION, DATA PRIVACY, AND THE  
PROBLEM OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 
 Some of the scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call 
prophesied that decentralized coordination of cultural and political 
activity by networked communities of peers would increasingly displace 
centralized, top-down control of cultural and political production, with 
transformative and broadly freedom-promoting effects.3 Without 
question, decentralized production strategies have expanded access to 
information and political capacity-building for people all around the 
world and have come to be regarded as essential tools for fostering 
human freedom in the networked information era. The grander visions of 
wholesale, democratizing transformation in political economy and in 
government have not materialized, however. Instead, strategies for 
decentralized cultural and political production have fueled a very 
different kind of transformation, organized around the emergence of 
dominant global platforms that afford new vantage points for 
surveillance, data harvesting, surplus extraction, and manipulation. 
 Some of the obstacles to commons-based cultural and political 
production were predictable. Leading software firms initially waged 
public and creative campaigns against open source software, labeling it 
unreliable, insecure, and a point of entry for organized crime. Although 
open source products and accompanying services eventually achieved 
widespread penetration in certain industry sectors and some once-
formidable opponents have become adherents, persistent, thorny issues 
continue to surround the interfaces between open source and proprietary 
systems and modules.4 The major content industries have resisted 
 
3 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Dan Hunter & F. 
Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004); 
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A 
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in 
COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62–91 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 
1997). 
4 See David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source: 
The Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Bryan 
Pfaffenberger, The Rhetoric of Dread: Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) in 
Information Technology Marketing, 13 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 78 (2000). 
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commons-based production and open-access distribution strategies for 
educational and cultural materials and have devised a continuing stream 
of legal and technological methods for asserting control over their 
products and business models.5 Political activists, for their part, quickly 
learned that the networked digital information environment afforded not 
only unprecedented scope for dissent and resistance but also new, hidden 
control points for state censorship and surveillance.6 
 Other failure modes for commons-based production were wholly 
unanticipated, and that was so in part because internet utopian projects 
elevated openness and freedom from control over all other priorities, 
most notably including privacy and data protection. Evangelists for 
internet openness, confident in the ability of enlightened netizens to 
assert their own privacy interests, painted calls for stricter regulation as 
threats to the net’s most fundamental values.7 But openness has proved a 
double-edged sword. The allure of open content models has been a 
powerful factor driving the emergence of new information businesses 
whose revenue models are based on harvesting and monetizing the data 
flows generated by content developers and content users, including 
global platform giants Google, Facebook, and Amazon and a host of 
 
5 See, e.g., Andi Sporkin, Publishers Applaud “Research Works Act,” 
Bipartisan Legislation to End Government Mandates on Private-Sector 
Scholarly Publishing, ASS’N OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS (Dec. 23, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/M5Y5-UJZC; Ian Graber-Stiehl, Science’s Pirate Queen, 
VERGE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/DY7H-7D4Y. See generally Anne-
Marie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online 
Copyright Enforcement, 89 ORE. L. REV. 81 (2010); Anne-Marie Bridy, Internet 
Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1524 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively 
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, The 
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Rebecca 
Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This Will Happen Again: 
Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447 (2014).  
6 REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE 
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 51–66 (2012); ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER 
AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 251–54 
(2017). 
7 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142–62 
(1998). But see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty 
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look 
at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996). 
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others.8 Platform protocols invite commons-based production 
arrangements, and commons-based production arrangements in turn 
reinforce platform logics of data harvesting and proprietary, algorithmic 
knowledge production.9 
 The results of distributed cultural and political production also 
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the contrary 
have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. The particular 
quality-control mechanisms that keep open source software robust and 
secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) objective work far less well 
(or not at all) within massively-intermediated environments that are 
optimized to advertiser-driven platform revenue models. In such 
environments, the vaunted “wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. 
Algorithmic processes optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt 
social sharing heighten the volatility of online interactions, and 
surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content 
targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful—and easily 
weaponized—stimulus-response feedback loops.10 The result is a 
sociotechnical apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and 
deepening preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions. 
 Under conditions of pervasive, data-driven intermediation—
enabled in part by thought leaders’ failure to take privacy and data 
protection seriously as worthy and freedom-advancing projects—power 
from below becomes power directed toward whatever purpose its 
organizers want to advance. Platform-based, massively-intermediated 
environments have become fertile breeding grounds for conspiracy 
theories (including coordinated campaigns to foster denialism about 
climate change, vaccination, and similar matters), disinformation 
campaigns designed to discredit political actors and institutions, and 
virulent forms of bigotry, ideological extremism, and ethnic 
 
8 See TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 
(2017); Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism 
in a Post IP Era, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. REV. 225 (2016). 
9 See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction 
of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, Law 
for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 153–61 (2017). 
10 On clickbait and social sharing strategies, see Bryan Gardiner, You’ll Be 
Outraged at How Easy It Was to Get You to Click on This Headline, WIRED 
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/4QXK-5M56; Alice Marwick, Why Do People 
Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects, 2 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 474 (2018), https://perma.cc/DT4C-94E. On surveillance as behavioral 
conditioning, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF 
POWER (2019). 
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nationalism.11 At the same time, and paradoxically, the increasingly 
pronounced orientation toward manufactured outrage and political 
polarization within such environments also dissipates other kinds of 
political energy. It has become more difficult to enlist networked publics 
in the work of building movements capable of growing, sustaining 
themselves, and organizing for change in the real world.12  
 Among scholars and commentators who write about digital 
media, a debate has raged about whether it is fair to blame dominant 
platforms for these problems. According to media scholar Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, “the problem with Facebook is Facebook,” and more 
specifically the combination of Facebook’s global reach, its 
optimization-based business model, and the ways that its information 
feeds have displaced other, potentially moderating sources of 
information.13 Others argue that such explanations unfairly blame 
platforms for longstanding dysfunctions that are not of their creation.14 
Without question, part of the problem with Facebook and others is the 
preexisting social and cultural divisions that information cascades 
amplify. That logic, though, undercuts the optimism about bottom-up 
organization that the Internet’s founding visionaries expressed. Part of 
the problem with Facebook and other platforms is people, easily 
distracted, highly susceptible to misinformation, and prone to herd 
behavior. It also undercuts the logic that designated the internet and its 
networked virtual spaces as sites of utopian separation for the life of the 
mind. Platform-based environments are inextricably embedded in real-
world societies; platform governance requires real-world, institutional 
(i.e., non-utopian) solutions. 
 
11 See Jonathan Albright, Untrue-Tube: Monetizing Misery and Disinformation, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y6BM-CQCD; Rob Faris, et al., 
Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 
U.S. Presidential Election, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOCY’ AT 
HARVARD UNIV. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/8SCW-R9HE; Alice 
Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation & Disinformation Online, 
DATA & SOC’Y (2017), https://perma.cc/356L-XZQA; Christopher Paul & 
Miriam Matthew, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: 
Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP.: PERSPECTIVES 
(2016), https://perma.cc/CLB5-A5AG; Julia Carrie Wong, How Facebook and 
YouTube Help Spread Anti-Vaxxer Propaganda, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/3NN6-R5Q7. 
12 See TUFECKI, supra note 6, at 189–222 (discussing examples). 
13 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS 
US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 1 (2018). 
14 See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, India’s Lynching Epidemic and the Problem 
with Blaming Tech, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/MBA8-LNYZ. 
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II. UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS:  
ANONYMITY, TRUST AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE 
 Other scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call focused 
on enabling capabilities for distributed, anonymous communication and 
coordination, and here again the scorecard is mixed. It is indisputable 
that anonymity has played an essential structural role in modern 
democratic societies and equally indisputable that networked information 
and communication technologies have provided anonymous dissenters 
with invaluable tools for naming and challenging abuses of economic 
and political power. Around the world, both activists pursuing social 
change and journalists reporting on controversial topics now rely on 
capabilities for anonymous, networked communication to protect 
themselves and their sources, and projects dedicated to creating, 
maintaining, and improving such capabilities have become sites of 
ongoing research and activism in their own right.15 Persistent and 
intractable questions remain, however, about the extent to which 
behaviors that historically have functioned as safety valves within more 
complex institutional structures can assume more central roles in the 
project of securing fundamental rights and freedoms for all people.  
 To begin with, and continuing the themes developed in the 
previous section, anonymous online activity has valences that are more 
complicated than romanticized narratives equating anonymity with press 
freedom and democratic self-determination acknowledge. The projects of 
building and sustaining utopia require utopians—people united in their 
unequivocal commitment to the ground truths and operating norms of a 
utopian project. Some utopian ground truths and operating norms are 
ugly and unworthy of anyone’s allegiance. In networked spaces, cadres 
of technological cognoscenti wield anonymity as a new and potent 
source of social and political power to be deployed toward a wide variety 
of ends. They orchestrate large-scale whistleblowing, operate safe 
channels for journalists, and distribute samizdat on behalf of political 
dissidents—and also spread hate speech, disinformation, and fascist and 
nationalist ideologies.  
 
15 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 227–37; Eva Galperin, Cell Phone Guide 
for Occupy Wall Street Protesters (and Everyone Else), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Oct. 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/7NAC-M9YB; Eva Galperin, Don’t Get Your 
Sources in Syria Killed, COMMITTEE TO PROJECT JOURNALISTS (May 21, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/37NY-TZAQ; Andy Greenberg, Laura Poitras on the Crypto 
Tools That Made Her Snowden Film Possible, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014); Jenna 
McLaughlin, The FBI vs. Apple Debate Just Got Less White, INTERCEPT (Mar. 8, 
2016), https://perma.cc/LM53-CRJG.  
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 More generally, the trajectories of projects designed to scale up 
certain types of anonymous interaction and communication demonstrate 
that breaking things is easier than rebuilding them. Consider two much-
discussed examples involving anonymous infrastructures for enabling 
fundamental market and governance functions. The first is the 
blockchain, a set of technological protocols for enabling distributed, 
secure authentication of transactions and credentials. In theory, such 
technologies might be deployed within existing institutional fabrics in 
ways that eliminate opportunities for corruption, waste, and rent-
seeking.16 But uses for private surplus extraction and self-interested (and 
environmentally destructive) speculation are far more widespread, and 
some argue that the highest and best uses of blockchain technologies 
involve the creation of alternative currencies to displace state-sponsored 
fiat currency and ultimately the state itself.17 The second example is 
WikiLeaks, which rapidly attained heroic status among civil liberties 
advocates for its stated commitment to facilitating anonymous 
whistleblowing about powerful wrongdoers. WikiLeaks, however, is not 
a free press advocacy organization. It rejects certain essential editorial 
and quality control functions that the press as an institution typically has 
performed and espouses an endgame that is far more disruptive.18 
WikiLeaks’ evolving role in the era of ascendant platform-based 
disinformation campaigns is proof that the distinction matters.19  
 
16 See generally PRIMAVERA DEFILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND 
THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018). 
17 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Is Bitcoin a Waste of Electricity, or 
Something Worse?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/7G2H-W9T6; 
Nellie Bowles, Making a Crypto Utopia in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 
2018), https://perma.cc/BZL4-AC5K. See generally KEVIN WERBACH, THE 
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST (2018). 
18 Compare Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the 
Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 311 (2011) (painting WikiLeaks heroically), with ANDY GREENBERG, THIS 
MACHINE KILLS SECRETS: HOW WIKILEAKS, CYPHERPUNKS, AND HACTIVISTS 
AIM TO FREE THE WORLD’S INFORMATION 285–313 (2012) (developing a more 
neutral account); see also Bill Keller, Dealing With Assange and the Wikileaks 
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/XP5Y-525Z 
(discussing editorial considerations). On the institutional functions of the press, 
see Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking 
Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV., 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300966. 
19 See Mark Fenster, ‘Bullets of Truth’: Julian Assange and the Politics of 
Transparency (Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 19-12, Jan. 
27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3323950; David 
A. Graham, Is WikiLeaks a Russian Front?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2018), 
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 As both of those examples illustrate, moreover, other obstacles 
to coding scalable, anonymity-centered, democratic institutions are 
cultural. As Gabriella Coleman has shown, hacker culture speaks the 
intertwined languages of liberal individualism and libertarianism and 
posits enlightened self-reliance and, by necessary implication, technical 
meritocracy as cardinal virtues.20 Those commitments in turn complicate 
efforts to transform digital anonymity from a tool for resistance to the 
foundation of a stable framework for guaranteeing fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Understood as (anti-)institutional projects, both 
WikiLeaks and blockchain-based cryptocurrency projects reflect 
ideologies that are powerfully utopian but not particularly democratic. 
They express and reproduce a particular kind of moral and ideological 
purity that is inconsistent with a broadly inclusive social compact. And 
they illustrate powerfully that, although capabilities for anonymous 
online communication and coordination have played and will continue to 
play an important role in efforts to secure fundamental rights and 
freedoms for all people, such capabilities cannot stand in for other kinds 
of institution-building. Structurally speaking, anonymous dissent and 
opposition are safety valves. Achieving durable, effective protection for 
fundamental rights and freedoms also requires other mechanisms.  
III. UNRAVELING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:  
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER 
 Both strands of utopian thinking about internet-enabled 
governance that I have just described are rooted in a more general habit 
of utopian thinking about the relationship between information and 
human freedom. That habit is deeply ahistorical. Networked information 
technologies are not simply instruments of liberation, nor do they simply 
afford new avenues for control and cooptation. Over the course of many 
decades, social and legal institutions have come to reflect the shaping 
influence of the “control revolution” that began with the introduction of 
automated information systems into industrial-era factories and 
 
https://perma.cc/W3HT-RMV5; see also Andy Greenberg, How Reporters 
Pulled Off The Panama Papers, The Biggest Leak in Whistleblower History, 
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/WJF9-EUMP (describing investigative 
journalists’ use of encryption tools to coordinate a controlled leak of documents 
detailing a massive scheme for global tax evasion). 
20 See generally GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, 
SPY: THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMOUS (2014); GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING 
FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF HACKING 183–205 (2012). 
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businesses.21 The processes of institutional evolution have produced new 
institutional configurations and competencies that are intensively 
informational in character and that have posed difficult challenges for 
traditional approaches to conceptualizing and enforcing fundamental 
human rights.  
 The same networked capabilities that enable widespread public 
access to information also have enabled powerful corporate entities to 
build and manage far-flung global empires. As a practical matter, such 
entities wield increasing power over the conditions of human freedom. 
Giant transnational corporations that construct global networked supply 
chains enjoy nearly unlimited authority over their workers and outsize 
influence over the surrounding communities. The state-centered human 
rights discourses and institutions that emerged in the post-World War II 
era did not contemplate such rearrangements, and both powerful 
economic actors and the developed economies of the Global North have 
resisted reform efforts that might bring transnational norms and domestic 
constitutional obligations to bear directly on private economic activity.22  
In the U.S., at least, the direction of constitutional reform has run the 
other way.23 
 Capabilities for networked digital communication and for highly 
informationalized, managerial oversight also have catalyzed profound 
changes in the structure and operation of regulatory and governance 
institutions, and those changes have unfolded in ways that have 
accelerated the marginalization of human rights commitments. The 
increasing power and prominence of network-and-standard-based legal-
institutional arrangements for economic governance—arrangements that 
exist to facilitate global flows of extractive activity and that tend to treat 
protective regulation as network damage—has left older human rights 
institutions increasingly sidelined.24 Meanwhile, as emergent human 
rights discourses and practices organized around capabilities for human 
flourishing and sustainable development have encountered and engaged 
 
21 See generally JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(1986). 
22 See generally STEFANIE KHOURY & DAVID WHYTE, CORPORATE HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: GLOBAL PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL ACTION (2017). 
23 See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018). 
24 On network-and-standard-based governance arrangements, see Julie E. Cohen, 
Networks, Standards, and Network-and-Standard-Based Governance, in AFTER 
THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach, ed., forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339351. 
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with economic governance arrangements, they have become increasingly 
expert-driven and inaccessible to the populations whose futures they 
affect. In particular, activists and advocates have raised persistent 
concerns about the methodological tyranny of utilitarianism in the 
articulation of development goals and benchmarks.25 Efforts to reorient 
human rights discourse and practice toward the problem of private 
economic power also have undergone a novel form of institutional 
cooptation that relocates those efforts inside corporations themselves and 
restyles them as “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practice. 
Initiatives such as the UN Global Compact rely on hortatory strategies to 
extract commitments that may or may not be honored and project an 
image of consensus around gradual forward progress that may or may 
not correspond to reality.26 
 The powerful global platform businesses that have emerged in 
the twenty-first century did not cause any of these changes, but they have 
proved apt at exploiting them. So, for example, as the European Union 
has worked to export its high standards for personal data protection to the 
rest of the world, U.S. platform businesses have supported efforts to 
insert strengthened mandates for cross-border flow into bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements, including especially agreements involving 
the Asian nations that are increasingly significant players in the emerging 
cross-border data servicing economy.27 Platform businesses also have 
taken an entrepreneurial approach to the CSR movement. The Global 
Network Initiative, founded in 2008 by a coalition of platform firms, 
academics, and human rights NGOs, represented an attempt both to 
 
25 See Sally Engle Merry & John M. Conley, Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 
(2011); AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: 
Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253 (2009). See generally 
KEVIN E. DAVIS, ANGELINA FISHER, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY ENGLE 
MERRY, EDS., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH 
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).  
26 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John 
Ruggie); The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://perma.cc/5LZV-AJYY (last accessed June 26, 2018); 
KHOURY & WHYTE, supra note 22, at 48–61. 
27 See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free 
Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 191 (2016); Graham Greenleaf, Free Trade Agreements 
and Data Privacy: Future Perils of Faustian Bargains, in TRANSATLANTIC 
DATA PRIVACY RELATIONS AS A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY 181–212 (Dan 
Svantesson  & Dariusz Kloza eds., 2017). 
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coordinate resistance to censorship demands by authoritarian states and 
to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding to such 
demands.28 Compliance with the GNI’s principles, however, remains 
voluntary and inconsistent, even as the vast and growing extent of 
commercial surveillance—encompassing information of an astonishing 
variety, granularity, and intimacy—deepens the symbiosis between 
public and private surveillance power.29  
 Last but not least, data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply 
both obstacles to accountability and opportunities for cooptation of 
accountability structures. Smart digital technologies produce decisions 
that are ad hoc, personalized, and pattern-based rather than principled 
and generalizable. They don’t give reasons for—or even draw attention 
to—the choices they make, and those choices are continually evolving. 
The design of automated machine-learning processes also includes a 
number of steps that scrutiny of their end results does not capture.30 
Those attributes sit in profound tension with traditional articulations of 
the institutional features that a commitment to the rule of law requires, 
and they create oversight problems that extend far outside the traditional 
competencies of courts.31 And here again, efforts to devise new oversight 
mechanisms have offered new avenues for the assertion and reproduction 
of informational power: Consider, for example, the Federal Trade 
Commission’s privacy and data security consent decrees, which rely 
heavily on attestations of compliance by private sector auditors that are 
 
28 GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL NETWORK 
INITIATIVE (May 2017), https://perma.cc/J32J-GMXB; see MACKINNON, supra 
note 6, at 138–39, 179–82. 
29 See, e.g., Daithi Mac Sithigh & Mathias Siems, The Chinese Social Credit 
System: A Model for Other Countries? (EUI Dept. of Law Working Paper 
2019/01), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3310085; David 
Cole, “We Kill People Based on Metadata,” N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/ERY2-Z44L; Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, 
The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, CTR. 
ON PRIVACY AND TECH., GEORGETOWN LAW (Oct. 18, 2016), 
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largely unverifiable and that bootstrap self-defined standards of 
adequacy.32 Or consider emergent regimes for “content moderation at 
scale,” which rely on a combination of privatized algorithmic governance 
and standardized performance reporting as a means of demonstrating 
compliance to the outside world.33 Both developments reflect beliefs 
about the best uses of new informational capabilities to manage legal and 
regulatory processes; neither expresses a commitment to robust public 
accountability.  
CONCLUSION 
 None of the problems I have described, of course, is Barlow’s 
fault. But those who would advance the intertwined projects of human 
freedom and democratic self-government should choose their prophets 
carefully—or, perhaps, should not place their faith in prophets at all. 
Advancing human freedom through the absence of law was never really 
in the cards. The difficulty, rather, is that the information-era problems 
now requiring institutional solutions are profoundly unfamiliar to 
institutional actors whose established modes of both action and self-
legitimation are backward-looking. New informational capabilities 
demand both new governance modalities and new institutional 
arrangements capable of deploying them effectively. Due in part to hard-
to-break habits of framing such questions as anti-openness, anti-
innovation, or conducive to censorship (or, more usually, all three), we 
still have vanishingly little idea what such capabilities and structures 
might look like and how they might be conformed in some recognizable 
way to rule-of-law ideals. Those are urgent projects for a post-utopian 
era. 
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